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By V. D. L.
TILDEN v. GREENE.-The annotation of the case involving the validity of Mr. Tilden's will, which appeared
in the February number of the AMfERICA.N LAW REGISTER
AND REVIEW, has received wide and favorable notice from
prominent members of the bar. The editors take this
opportunity of stating that the annotation was written by
Howard Wurts Page, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar. His
signature to the annotation was omitted through the carelessness of the printer.

IR. JUSTICE BRADLEY.-The death of Mr. Justice
Bradley has removed from the Supreme Court one of the
few men who will live in the constitutional history of our
country. To him, as much as to any other member of the
bench, we are indebted for much of the recent development
of constitutional law, especially in its application to complicated commercial questions growing out of the "Commnerce Clause."
The editors regret that lack of space
prevents them in this number from entering into any extended review of his work on the bench. Such a review
will appear in the April number of the magazine.
RAILWAY Co. V. STATE OF M\AINE: A PROTEST.-The
fascination of the study of the development of our constitutional law lies in the gradual and logical unfolding of principles. The result is a body of law that has made the
Court, which has been and still is creating and applying
it, the admiration of the civilized world. It is seldom that
a principle, well established, the expediency of which has
been tested for many years, and affirmed in innumerable
cases, is weakened, if not temporarily destroyed, by a
decision of that Court. Such a decision the student reads

EDITORIAL NOTES.

almost with a feeling of pain. For the moment study
seems to have been thrown away; he is unable to determine
how far that which he believed to have been settled is unsettled, or even to surmise what will be the next change
in that law, the wise development of which is vital to the
welfare of his country.
Since the case of Hinson v. Lctt t decided that a State
could tax an import from another State, provided it placed
the same tax on its manufacture within the State, no
decision of the Supreme Court seems to be fraught with
more far-reaching consequences than that of the State of
Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Company,' decided December f4, 189i. A law of the State required every railroad, for the use of its franchise, to pay a tax whose amount
depended on two factors: first, the proportion of its lines
within the State to the total mileage of the company;
second, the amount of the gross receipts of the road. These
receipts are derived almost exclusively from the transportation of the interstate and foreign freight. The Court held
the tax constitutional, because, in the words of Mr. Justice
FIELD, it is "an excise tax upon the defendant corporation
for the privilege of exercising its franchise within the
State. 'I
The late Mr. Justice BRADLEY, Justices LAMAR, HARLAN and BROWN dissented. The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice BRADLEY, appears in the reports as the

last official words of that great jurist. Its conclusion is a
vigorous protest against that policy adopted by State legislatures which fastens all the burdens of government on the
business of transportation. Concerning the decision of the
Court, he says: "Justices Harlan, Lamar, Brown and myself dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case.
We do so both on principle and authority-on principle
because, whilst the purpose of the law professes to lay a tax
upon the foreign company for the privilege of exercising its
franchise in the State of Maine, the mode of doing this is
unconstitutional. "J
18 Wall, 148.
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If there has been one rule of law which has been heretofore considered as finally determined apparently beyond the
possibility of a doubt, it is that a tax falls upon that upon
which its amount is graded. This is the cardinal rule of the
law which, while not always explicitly recognized, has lain at
the foundation of all the decisions touching the power of
the State to collect taxes from corporations engaged in interstate commerce. That a State has the right to tax the
capital stock, the property of corporations, or to charge for
its franchise is undoubted ; but the way in which the State
can exercise this right has of late been curtailed by the
salutary rule, that a tax is void which, in reality, falls on
interstate or foreign commerce. The name which the legislature gives to the tax has always been considered immaterial. Thus, except in the case of the Baltimore
R. R. Co. v. Maryland, a case which it was hoped
time and the more recent decisions of the Court had
overruled, the name which the Legislature chose to give
to a tax did not make it valid, when under another name
it would be void. In Leloup v. Port of Mobile,' the fact
that the tax was called a license fee for establishing an office
and doing business in the State did not prevent the Court
from declaring it void when applied to telegraph companies engaged in interstate commerce. But it now seems
that, while calling a tax a license fee does not aid the law,
calling it a franchise tax covers all defects.
It is true the legislature might have refused the fran.chise, though they could not refuse a license to carry on
interstate business ; but it has never been held that the power
of refusal carried with it the power to impose illegal conditions, especially after the permission to excrcise the franchise
has been granted. This is principle involved in the decision in Barron v. Burnside,' which declared unconstitutional a State law requiring a foreign corporation, as a condition of doing business in the State, not to remove its
causes to the Federal courts. The right to refuse to allow
the foreign corporation to do business in the State did not
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carry with it an implied power on the part of the States to
violate the spirit of the Constitution.", Yet in the case from
Maine the Court says : "As the granting of the privilege
rests entirely in the discretion of the State, whether the corporation be of domestic or foreign origin, it may be conferred
upon such conditions, pecuniary or otherwise, as the State
in its judgment may deem most conducive to its interests
or policy. It may require the payment into its treasury,
each year, of a specific sum, or may apportion the amount
exacted according to value of the business permitted, as
disclosed by its gains or receipts of the present or past
years. The character of the tax or its validity is not determined by the mode adopitedin fixing its amountfor any
spbecificfperiod or the times of its piayment. The whole field
of inquiry into the extent of revenue from sources at the
command of the corporation is open to the consideration
of the State in determining what may be justly exacted
for the privilege. The rule of apportioning the charge to
the receipts of the btziness would seem to be. eminently
reasonable, and likely to produce the most satisfactory results, both to the State and the corporation taxed."
The case Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania,'
differs from the one under consideration only in the name
the legislature applied to the tax. In both cases the State
taxed the gross receipts irrrespective of the source, whether
they came from internal or interstate and foreign commerce. In other words, the tax was non-discriminating.
In both cases one of the factors in determining the amount
of the tax was the amount of business. It was this element which caused the Court to declare unanimously that
the law of Pennsylvania unconstitutional. The professional and the business world applauded the decision.
It is true the Maine Legislature made the amount of the
tax depend on another factor besides the earnings of the
road, namely, the proportion of number of miles of line
to the total mileage operated by the company. There is
no question of the power of the State to tax the property
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of a read as property, though used in interstate business,

provided the property is within the State, but it has never
before been maintained that a tax whose amount varied
according to two factors was valid if, as a result, the tax
fell on one subject under the control of the State, no matter how many other subjects beyond the control of the
State were affected. The adoption of such a principle
would render a tax by the State of New York on the
amount of Chicago beef eaten by its citizens constitutional,
provided the tax also depended on the total value of all
butcher wagons in the State.
Perhaps, however, unconsciously, the principle by
which the majority of the Court upheld the Maine law is,
that the constitutionality of a State tax is to be tested by
supposing all the States to pass similar laws, and then
determining, in such an event, whether the same subject
matter would be taxed twice. This principle was first
recognized in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania.'
A tax on the capital stock of a company, based on the
average number of cars which the company had within the
State, was held to be constitutional, though the cars were
engaged solely in interstate traffic. The Court sustained
the law on the ground that if each State adopted this
method of taxation the result would be that the property
of the company was only taxed as property within each
State, and that no property would be taxed twice over.
Whatever may be said in favor of this principle, as one to
determine whether property or persons are within a State
for the purposes of taxation, or, as applied as in Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, the distinction between the
application of the principle in that case and its application
to the one under discussion is obvious. A tax on property
within the State, whether that property is engaged in interstate commerce or not, has been held to be constitutional; but previous to this last decision a State tax on the
business of interstate commerce, whether carried on within
or without the State, was always declared unconstitutional.
1141 U. S., IS.
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Yet, what else but a tax on interstate commerce .is the
result if each State can tax an interstate carrier of freight
according to the receipts from such carriage within the
State ?
The freedom of commercial intercourse from the interference of local governments was the chief reason why we
adopted a Constitution and became a nation. This freedom
was supposed to extend, and we cannot but hope will yet
be authoritatively determined to extend, not only to immunity from the legislation of a State hampering such
or
commercial intercourse, but froni this "interstate"
"combined State" legislation which has the same tendency. Legislation, whose effect on the commerce of the
country, if attempted by one State would render it unconstitutional, surely cannot be made constitutional by all the
State legislatures acting in concert.

THE

RIGHT OF CONTRACTING. WITH

OTHER STATES.'-Mr.

CITIZENS OF

McMurtrie, in his comment on the

expression of opinion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,besides calling attention to the fact that the clause in the
Constitution preventing a State from impairing the obligation of contracts wofild be ineffectual to preserve our liberties,
if it was not for the commerce clause, by implication raises an
interesting question of constitutional law. As long ago as
the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the right of a State
to prohibit a foreign corporation, chartered under the laws
of another State, from doing business in the State, has
been undoubted. The only exceptions are corporations
authorized by Congress, as iftstruments to carry out one of
the powers delegated to that body, and corporations engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, or commerce
with the Indian tribes. That corporations are not citizens
in the sense that they have the right to enter and do busiIFor the case and criticism referred to, see Comments on Recent Decisions, infra.

